




Language is not indispensable for thought. Non-
human animals solve complex cognitive tasks while
lacking anything close to the human communica-
tion system; and human children achieve incredible
cognitive feats long before they are able to partic-
ipate in conversations. Still, language is our most
powerful tool for the bulk of cognitive activities we
frequently engage in, from the categorization of our
perceptions to the planning of our actions. But the
language we speak as our mother tongue is also a
tool with a history and of a specific shape. It is struc-
tured through and through, in ways that differ from
one language to the next, and it comprises classifi-
cation systems, sets of contrasts, and requests for
specifications that would seem to afford and sug-
gest some lines of thought more easily than others.
As we know from research on problem-solving (see
Chapter 9, “Problem Solving”), tools are typically
used in a specific context and for specific purposes,
while using them in novel ways is challenging for hu-
mans (e.g., Duncker, 1935). A similar phenomenon
might therefore be expected for language when used
as a tool for describing observations, categorizing
them, or drawing inferences from them. This anal-
ogy raises a tantalizing question: Do speakers of
different languages develop different views of the
world?
Suggestive phrasings that influence interpretation
and memory (Carmichael et al., 1932; Loftus &
Palmer, 1974), requests for using gender-neutral
or -inclusive language to reduce gender discrimina-
tion (Irmen & Kurovskaja, 2010; Prewitt-Freilino et
al., 2012), and the finding that repetitions of wrong
statements make them sound true (the illusory truth
effect; Bacon, 1979; Hasher et al., 1977), all attest
to the power that language can unfold in shaping the
social world (see Chapter 11, “The Nature of Lan-
guage”). But does it gain this power by only shaping
the world we live in or also by directly affecting our
cognition? To what extent do systematic differences
between languages and their grammatical structures
cause differences in how their speakers perceive,
categorize, reason, or make decisions?
To address these questions, we first present the
principle of linguistic relativity and its various read-
ings (sections 12.1 and 12.2). Two of the most plau-
sible readings are then examined in more detail, il-
lustrated with one example each: color perception
and numerical cognition (section 12.3). Against this
backdrop we then elaborate on the role of language
as a cognitive tool (section 12.4).
12.1 The Principle of Linguistic
Relativity
The idea that language may affect thought can be
traced back at least to the 18th century, to schol-
ars like Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) or
Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835). Today, how-
ever, it is most strongly associated with the names
of ethnolinguists Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and
Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941), which is why
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the idea in more recent literature is often referred
to as the “Sapir Whorf hypothesis” or the “Whor-
fian hypothesis”. Whorf (1956) himself used the
term “principle of linguistic relativity”, deliber-
ately in the style of Einstein’s principle of relativity
in physics—for two reasons. First, Whorf made
a claim similar to Einstein’s, namely, that objec-
tive or absolute descriptions of the world indepen-
dent of a given viewpoint are impossible (hence
“relativity”), in this case because our perceptions
and categorizations are influenced by the linguistic
structures implicit in our native languages. Second,
Whorf considered this linguistic relativity a premise
for research, not its target (hence a “principle” and
not a “hypothesis”). In the cognitive sciences, and
specifically in cognitive psychology, this idea is still
highly controversial, even to this date.
12.1.1 Fundamental Theses
The principle of linguistic relativity is based on three
general theses (Lucy, 1997; Wolff & Holmes, 2011):
• Languages differ with regard to how they de-
scribe the world. [Thesis 1]
• The specific way in which a language de-
scribes the world affects the experiences made
by its speakers. [Thesis 2]
• Speakers of different languages therefore ex-
perience the world differently. [Thesis 3]
Let us illustrate this argument with a concrete ex-
ample. Even closely related languages differ with
regard to classes into which they sort their nouns
(Thesis 1). So-called formal gender languages as-
sign a grammatical gender to every single noun. Ro-
mance languages like French, Italian, or Spanish,
for instance, contain two of these classes: masculine
and feminine. Other Indo-European languages like
Greek, German, or Russian make use of a neuter
in addition to the masculine and feminine. Parts of
Norwegian, Swedish, or Dutch conflate two of these,
namely, masculine and feminine gender as common
gender in opposition to the neuter gender. And En-
glish has given up all gender distinctions (at least
those that are not grounded in biological gender)
and hence is no longer a formal gender language.
Still, it differentiates gender in personal pronouns
(“he”, “she”, “it”), but even this apparently basic
categorization is not a linguistic universal. Polyne-
sian languages such as Tongan, for instance, distin-
guish between a single person, pairs of persons, and
groups of persons, and between selections of people
that do or do not include the addressee, but they do
not care about gender.
According to Thesis 2, linguistic categorizations
like gender classes or inclusion criteria for personal
pronouns help us to organize and structure the “kalei-
doscopic flux of impressions” in which the world
is presented (Whorf, 1956, p. 213f.). Since the lin-
guistic categories constitute the largely indiscernible
background against which our conscious considera-
tions take place, they do their organizing work with-
out our noticing it. It may appear only consistent,
therefore, to assume that linguistic categories in the
language in which one forms one’s thoughts would
contribute to shaping those very thoughts. Applied
to our example, such organizing would be at work if
speakers of German associated the sun more strongly
with female attributes because die Sonne is feminine,
and the moon more strongly with male attributes be-
cause der Mond is masculine—in contrast to, for
instance, speakers of Spanish, for which el sol is
masculine and la luna feminine (Koch et al., 2007).
Thesis 3, finally, implies that speakers of Ger-
man differ in their associations of sun and moon
from speakers of Spanish precisely because the two
languages assign grammatical gender reversely to
these two words. Examples like these are the key
target of crosslinguistic studies on linguistic relativ-
ity, and we come back to findings from such studies
in section 12.2.
12.1.2 Do Languages Differ in their
Description of the World?
As you may have noticed, if you read Chapter 7 on
deductive reasoning carefully, the three theses form
a syllogistic argument, in which Thesis 3 follows
logically from Theses 1 and 2. In other words, if
the first two theses are considered true, the third
one must also be considered true. But even the ap-
parently least controversial Thesis 1 was rejected
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for several decades in both psychology and linguis-
tics. Distinguished scholars advocated the position
that the commonalities of human languages, which
they attributed to a “universal grammar” module in
humans, by far outweigh the differences between
languages (e.g., Chomsky, 1986; Pinker, 1994). On
this account, the diversity in, for instance, gender
categories and gender assignment to nouns across
languages would be considered a minor detail that
would be irrelevant to how people perceive objects
and their properties.
With more indepth investigations of a broad range
of languages, however, the differences between lan-
guages are now taken more seriously (Dabrowska,
2015; Evans & Levinson, 2009), and some of these
differences are involved in coding and emphasizing
relevant information in sensible, if even in language-
specific ways. For instance, when expressing motion
by way of verbs, some languages (such as English,
Russian, or Chinese) emphasize the manner of the
movement over its path whereas others (including
Spanish, Greek, or Japanese) emphasize path over
manner. For illustration, compare the following two
sentences which are borrowed from Papafragou and
Selimis (2010, p.227, footnote 2):
(1) The bird is flying out of the cage.
(2) The bird is exiting from the cage (flying).
In (1), the emphasis rests on the manner of motion
(here: flying in contrast to, say, tripping), while in
(2) it rests on the path of motion (exiting in contrast
to, say, entering). In English, the manner of motion
is expressed by the verb itself (“flying”), whereas
path information is expressed by way of a prepo-
sition (“out of”). A roughly comparable statement
in Greek (2) expresses information on the path of
motion in the verb (“exiting”) whereas the manner
of motion would have to be explicated by way of an
attribute (here as “flying”) or actually in a second
sentence with a new verb.
Such language-specific differences are also docu-
mented for other types of semantically meaningful
categories (such as tense in verbs, or the distinc-
tion between countable objects and substances; see,
Wolff & Holmes, 2011, for an overview). For this
reason, the controversial debate has shifted in re-
cent years and is now focusing on Thesis 2: Does
the specific way in which a language describes the
world really affect the experiences of its speakers?
In other words: Do speakers of English and of Greek
perceive motions in distinct and different ways?
12.1.3 Do Different Descriptions of the
World Affect Our Experiences?
The most radical position with regard to the relation
of language and thought is the position of behav-
iorism, as represented by John Watson. Watson
conceived of thought simply as inner speech—a po-
sition that soon turned out to be untenable. The
position at the opposite end of the spectrum is advo-
cated, for instance, by Noam Chomsky, the linguist
who became famous in the 1950s for crushing be-
haviorist accounts of language. The view he made
popular is that language and thought are two entirely
separate and distinct modules (e.g., Chomsky, 1986),
hence precluding, by definition, any potentiality of
linguistic relativity (Pinker, 1994). Prevailing for
decades, this view still has supporters, but is slowly
losing ground. Specifically, developmental psychol-
ogists in the tradition of Lev Vygotsky and Jean
Piaget have been arguing that, while cognition and
language may emerge and develop independently
from one another, they become entangled later on
in a complex relationship. This view is further sup-
ported by empirical evidence that cognitive develop-
ment more generally spurs on language development
(overview in Harley, 2014).
The principle of linguistic relativity differs from
both the behaviorist and the modular position in that
it considers language and thought neither as iden-
tical nor as entirely separate. Nor do proponents
of linguistic relativity dispute that thought is pos-
sible without language or that it (at least ideally)
precedes language use. However, they emphasize
more strongly than others the possibility that prop-
erties of the language one speaks may also affect
aspects of how one thinks. Unfortunately, neither
Sapir nor Whorf elaborated their ideas on linguis-
tic relativity into a coherent theory. As one con-
sequence, research in this field is plagued to this
date by a plurality of possible readings. Our attempt
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to systematize these readings follows the overview
presented by Wolff and Holmes (2011).
One of the central dimensions on which possible
readings differ is concerned with the question of
whether language and thought are structurally paral-
lel or different. The former case would support the
position of linguistic determinism: In this case we
would be able to engage only in those thoughts that
our language permits. This most extreme form of lin-
guistic relativity—frequently associated with Whorf
even though he himself was rather ambivalent on
this view (Whorf, 1956; and see Lee, 1996)—is of
little intuitive plausibility and also refuted by empir-
ical research (overview in Wolff & Holmes, 2011).
This research demonstrated clearly that thought is
more strongly guided by properties of the world than
by linguistic labels (Imai & Gentner, 1997; Malt &
Wolff, 2010).
Even if one accepts that language and thought
may be structured in distinct ways, linguistic relativ-
ity could still unfold in one of several ways (Wolff
& Holmes, 2011; and see Figure 12.1). Depend-
ing on the specific reading, these would assume an
influence of language during
• thinking before language, that is, when we
organize our thoughts to prepare a linguistic
utterance (i.e., thinking for speaking),
• thinking with language, that is, when linguis-
tic representations enter into conflict with, or
instead support, non-linguistic representations
(language as meddler or as augmenter, respec-
tively),
• thinking after language, that is, when linguis-
tic effects linger on and thereby ‘color’ our
thoughts in language-specific ways (language
as spotlight and language as inducer).
In section 12.2, we explain in more detail the
first and third reading (thinking before and after lan-
guage) as they are closely associated, before turning
to two examples of the second reading (thinking
with language) in section 12.3.
12.2 Thinking before and after
Language
12.2.1 Thinking before Language
(“Thinking for Speaking”)
Lexical items make differentiations possible, as for
distinguishing between pastel green, moss green,
and turquoise. Grammatical structures do not simply
afford such differentiations but require them. When
we put our thoughts into words—and even before we
can begin doing this—a number of decisions need
to be made. These include having relevant informa-
tion available that need to be specified according to
the grammar/grammatical rules of the language we
intend to use. For illustration, take the categories of
tense and aspect that in many languages tend to be
realized in the verb. Both categories provide infor-
mation on time, but they focus on different facets
Figure 12.1: The most plausible ways in which language may affect thinking (according to Wolff & Holmes, 2011), and the relation
between them.
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of time: Tense specifies the time in which an event
takes place (e.g., in the past, present, or future),
while aspect specifies how this event extends over
time (e.g., whether it is ongoing versus terminated,
or whether it is progressive versus habitual).
In German, each verb form always requires an in-
stantiation of tense—for example, the present tense
in (3) and the past tense in (4)—but largely disre-
gards aspect.
(3) Dieser Papagai redet. [“This parrot talks”]
(4) Dieser Papagai redete. [“This parrot talked”]
In English, aspect needs to be specified in ad-
dition to tense, with (5) indicating habitual action,
whereas (6) indicates progressive action:
(5) This parrot talks.
(6) This parrot is talking.
In Tongan and other Polynesian languages, or in
Chinese, neither tense nor aspect is expressed in the
verb.
In order to form a grammatically correct sentence,
speakers of German therefore need to specify when
an event is happening, but need not specify whether
it is or is not ongoing. In other words: The aim
to express something in language forces one to pay
attention to specific types of information while we
may safely ignore others. This effect of language on
thought, famously labeled “thinking for speaking”
by Slobin (1996), emerges before language is actu-
ally used and can be observed in various domains
(Gennari et al., 2002; Papafragou et al., 2008). A
second example for this type is the distinct focus,
described earlier (in section 12.1.2), that languages
direct at either the manner or the path of motion
(Papafragou & Selimis, 2010).
12.2.2 Thinking after Language
If we accept an influence of thinking for speaking,
it follows almost naturally that an entire life of oc-
casions in which we need to verbalize our thoughts
would form habits regarding what we pay attention
to. These habits should have a certain likelihood to
linger on also in contexts in which respective infor-
mation is not immediately required for verbalization,
that is, during thinking without imminent need for
speaking. In emphasizing some distinctions—say,
with regard to time point or temporal course—more
than others through compulsory grammatical cat-
egories (here: tense or aspect), languages would
therefore still direct attention to the same types of
information in a regular and sustained manner, like
a spotlight (this is why Wolff & Holmes, 2011, dub
this instance of thinking after language the spotlight
effect). One of the instances Wolff and Holmes cite
for this effect is the gender distinction mentioned
earlier.
Yet, both in terms of theoretical plausibility and
of empirical support, the category of grammatical
gender has remained a rather controversial case. Se-
mantic gender languages assign a gender only to
living things that possess a biological gender (sex),
whereas formal gender languages extend the gender
distinction to all nouns regardless of whether their
referents have a sex. English is an example of the
former, German of the latter. The two languages
alike assign masculine gender to living things like
“man”, “son”, or “rooster”, and feminine gender to
“woman”, “daughter”, or “hen”. But while almost
all inanimate things are neuter in English, a large
proportion of them are categorized as masculine or
feminine in German (e.g., der Mond [themasc moon],
die Sonne [thefem sun]). Hence, as a formal class,
grammatical gender does not reflect genuine differ-
ences in the world. It serves the purely linguistic
function to generate congruence within sentences,
and particularly between the noun and the accompa-
nying article and adjective, as in (7) and (8):
(7) ein_ heller Mond [“a bright moon”]
(8) eine helle Sonne [“a bright sun”]
Notably, also, relatively few languages distin-
guish exactly between the two genders of interest,
namely, masculine and feminine gender; many oth-
ers categorize on different grounds, with some even
conflating the two (such as Swedish or Dutch) and
some distinguishing up to 20 different genders (Cor-
bett, 1991).
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Gender distinctions have still attracted consider-
able interest as a subject for studies on linguistic rel-
ativity (e.g., Boroditsky et al., 2003; Konishi, 1993).
A popular measure in these studies is the gender
congruency effect (see Chapter 11, “The Nature of
Language”). It emerges if the grammatical gender of
a noun (e.g., masculine in the case of Mond) is con-
gruent with the association of the respective referent
with a specific sex (here: moon as male). How-
ever, the more sophisticated the methods used for
investigation (e.g., adopting implicit tasks instead of
direct assessments), the more difficult it turned out
to replicate the initially positive findings (overview
in Bender et al., 2018).
For better suited and more convincing examples
of the spotlight effect we therefore need to turn to
domains in which linguistic categories do reflect—
and make salient—genuine characteristics of the
world. Only then do they have the potential and
the power to habitually redirect attention to these
characteristics.
One such example is spatial referencing. A frame
of reference (FoR) is a linguistic tool for describing
relations between entities. It provides a coordinate
system for locating a thing (say: a ball) in reference
to another thing (say: a boy) and comes in three
types (Levinson, 2003): The absolute FoR is aligned
with external fixed points such as the cardinal direc-
tions or a river; the intrinsic FoR is aligned with the
point of reference (here the boy); and the relative
FoR is aligned with the perspective of an observer.
Importantly, languages differ in which of these FoRs
they can use or prefer, and this in turn affects peo-
ple’s wayfinding skills, their cospeech gestures, how
they memorize relations and orders, or how they
think about time (Bender & Beller, 2014; Levinson,
2003; Majid, Bowerman, Kita, Haun, & Levinson,
2004).
12.3 Thinking with Language
Besides the obvious case of thinking for speaking
and the likely case of the spotlight effect, both of
which arise from the need to focus on information
requested by one’s grammar, two more readings of
linguistic relativity have been investigated quite ex-
tensively in the past decades: one focusing on the
possibility that linguistic representations enter into
conflict or interfere with non-linguistic representa-
tions (language as meddler), the other focusing on
the possibility that linguistic representations support,
augment, or even make possible non-linguistic repre-
sentations (language as augmenter). In both of these
cases, it is the role of language as a cognitive tool
that opens up an influence of language on thought.
12.3.1 Language as Meddler: The Case
of Color Perception
Color is an excellent example for investigating the
influence of language on perception and other cogni-
tive processes because colors can be exactly defined
and measured in terms of the wavelength of light.
The color terms we use to denote different colors
verbalize a categorical system that we impose on the
physically unstructured color spectrum, and hence
are a product of thought. The interesting question
now is whether these color terms, once established,
also impact on thought. That is: If two languages
divide the color spectrum in different ways, will the
speakers of these languages also perceive the colors
in different ways?
That languages indeed differ in how they divide
the color spectrum has been well known for half
a century (Berlin & Kay, 1969), systematically
documented in the World-Color-Survey, a large-
scale research program at the University of Califor-
nia, Berkeley (http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/wcs/).
This research program focuses on basic color terms—
words that are elementary, generally applied, and
broadly understood. In order to qualify as elemen-
tary, a color term needs to be a single word; com-
posed expressions like “dark red” or “forest green”
are therefore excluded. A color term is considered
general if it can be applied to any kind of object;
a term like “blond” is hence excluded because its
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usage is restricted to hair. Terms like “magenta” or
“burgundy”, finally, do not qualify because they are
not widely known.
Following these specifications, English is consid-
ered to comprise eleven basic color terms: “black”,
“grey”, and “white” for achromatic colors, and “red”,
“yellow”, “green”, “blue”, “orange”, “pink”, “pur-
ple”, and “brown” for chromatic colors (Berlin &
Kay, 1969). Many languages have fewer basic color
terms than English, but some languages also have
more. For instance, English uses different terms for
green and blue, whereas Welsh subsumes them un-
der one term (Lazar-Meyn, 2004), and both Italian
(Paggetti et al., 2016) and Russian (Davies & Cor-
bett, 1994) distinguish blue further into a light blue
and a dark blue (Table 12.1).
Do, therefore, speakers of Welsh, English, and
Italian or Russian perceive the respective colors dif-
ferently? This question can be investigated by select-
ing colors with equal intervals in their hue so that the
selected colors in one language all fall into the same
category (e.g., blue), while they are separated by a
categorical boundary in the other language, as with
goluboj versus sinij (see Figure 12.2a). If the lin-
guistic categorization has an impact on perception,
the difference between hues that are separated by
the categorical boundary should be overestimated,
compared to the identical difference between two
hues that belong to the same category. In our exam-
ple, this would be the case for speakers of Russian,
but not English. In adopting this strategy, several
studies could demonstrate that such a categorical
boundary does not influence color perception per
se, but does influence other cognitive processes in-
volved in similarity judgments, rapid distinctions
between hues, learning of new color categories, or
the recognition of hues (Kay & Kempton, 1984;
Mitterer et al., 2009; Roberson et al., 2005).
One such study (Winawer et al., 2007) investi-
gated whether a categorical boundary affects color
discrimination in speakers of Russian compared
with speakers of English, using stimuli from the
color range denoted as “blue” in English (Fig-
ure 12.2a). Participants were shown squares in dif-
ferent shades of blue arranged in a triad and were
asked which of the two on the bottom matches the
one on the top (Figure 12.2b). In some trials, the
non-identical hue at the bottom was from the same
color category as the target hue; in others, it was
from the complementary color category. It turned
out that shades of blue were indeed easier to distin-
guish if they belonged to different categories than
if they belonged to the same category. Interestingly,
this holds particularly for stimuli projected onto the
right visual field, which is connected to the left hemi-
sphere in the brain (Gilbert et al., 2006). Brain areas
involved in color perception and language process-
ing are activated faster and more strongly by the
distinction of colors that belong to different cate-
gories (Siok et al., 2009) and of colors that are easy
to name (Tan et al., 2008).
Whether such effects of categorical boundaries
originate from conscious processes has not been con-
clusively clarified. At first glance, it seems plausible
that people use a naming strategy and that different
naming of colors leads to differently remembered
Table 12.1: Basic color terms in four Indo-European languages for the green-blue section.
Welsh glas
English green blue
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Figure 12.2: Stimuli used in the study by Winawer and colleagues (2007): the different shades of blue (a) and an example of a stimuli
triad (b). Participants were asked to pick one of the two squares from the lower row that matched the color of the single
square above (©(2007) National Academy of Sciences, U.S.A.; permission to reprint granted).
colors (Mitterer et al., 2009). However, participants
themselves reported that the colors they categorized
as different actually looked different (Kay & Kemp-
ton, 1984, p.75). At least in this type of task, it
seems, therefore, that what tips the scales is not the
explicit verbal naming of the color but rather an
automatic, non-conscious activation of categorical
information.
The studies on color perception are the classic in
the field of linguistic relativity and have contributed
greatly to advancing the field in terms of both the-
oretical clarification and methodological elabora-
tion. Still, the potential effects of the (color) lexicon
should not be overrated. While the lexicon provides
options for differentiation from which speakers can
choose, these options can easily be complemented
in case they turn out to be insufficient. If you deem
neither “red” nor “brown” the appropriate label for
the color of a chestnut, you can consider using “red-
brown” or “chestnut-colored” or simply invent a
new label such as “maroon”. But the fact that color
perception is strongly determined by biological and
anatomic factors renders findings in this domain still
significant. After all, color vision is based on the ex-
act same mechanism in all members of our species
(apart from those with color blindness); the photore-
ceptor cells responsible for human color vision are
particularly sensitive for certain wavelengths of light
and hence for certain color experiences. In other
words: If verbally mediated differentiations are able
to modify cognitive processes even in this funda-
mental domain, an even stronger influence might be
expected in domains in which biological constraints
are less pronounced.
12.3.2 Language as Augmenter: The
Case of Numerical Cognition
Handling numbers is a key skill in modern daily
lives. While mathematics is something that many
people try to keep at arm’s length, the ability to pre-
cisely assess the number of a set of items certainly
strikes most as utterly simple. And yet, competently
dealing with numbers is not at all natural. A bio-
logically evolved precondition that we share with
many other species is the ability to perceive quan-
tity. This includes the ability to keep track of up to
four distinct items by way of immediate perception
(called subitizing) and to approximately estimate
larger quantities (Feigenson et al., 2004). By con-
trast, the ability for exact quantification (i.e., accu-
rately assessing, remembering, and reconstructing
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numbers beyond the subitizing range) is uniquely
human. It presupposes cultural mediation, specifi-
cally a cultural tool, and extensive training (Núñez,
2017). The prototypical tool essential for acquiring
this competence is a conventionalized counting se-
quence: an ordered list of number representations
(numerals), each of which refers to a clearly defined
exact number (Wiese, 2003).
Not all natural languages used by humans com-
prise such counting sequences. Mundurukú, for in-
stance, a language spoken in Amazonia, is counted
among the few attestable cases in which numerals
do occur, but lack precise numerical meaning. The
fifth numeral pũg põgbi, for instance, does not mean
precisely 5, but only roughly 5, and can refer to val-
ues from 4 up to 12, depending on context (Pica
et al., 2004). Pirahã, another Amazonian language,
is claimed to comprise no numerals at all (Everett,
2005). Psychological studies in these two Amazo-
nian groups indicate that the lack of precise numer-
als impairs the ability to exactly memorize, recall,
and match larger quantities (Frank et al., 2008; Gor-
don, 2004; Pica et al., 2004). Similar issues are
also observed in home-signers. A home-sign is a
rudimentary sign language typically developed by
deaf children to hearing parents. As home-signs
are created in the absence of linguistic input, they
typically lack conventionalized and stable counting
sequences (Spaepen et al., 2011). And even students
of US American Ivy League universities experience
the very same challenges in numerical tasks if they
are prevented (e.g., by verbal interference) from ac-
tively using number words (Frank et al., 2012).
However, the potential for differences between
languages is not confined to the presence or absence
of counting sequences. Counting sequences them-
selves can also vary extensively in terms of their
properties, which depend on the number and shape
of the elements in a sequence, their order and re-
lations, or the modality in which they are realized
(Bender & Beller, 2012; Chrisomalis, 2010; Widom
& Schlimm, 2012). No two number systems on
this planet would therefore be exactly alike. Even a
number as simple and small as 5 can be denoted in
Table 12.2: A selection of possibilities for representing 5.
Language/Cultural Example Representation Decomposition / Translation Range
Pirahã (Amazonia/Brazil) “hói”, “hoí”, or
“baágiso” (depending
on elicitation order)
“somewhat larger size or
amount”
[1 – 6] (hói)
[2 – 10] (hoí)
[3 – 10] (baágiso)
Mundurukú (Amazonia/Brazil) “pũg põgbi“ one hand [4 – 12]
English (various places) “five” 5 [5]
French (various places) “cinq” 5 [5]
Tongan (Polynesia) “nima” 5 [5]
Adzera (Papua New Guinea) “iru? da iru? da bits” 2 + 2 + 1 [5]
various ||||| or |||| 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 [5]
various 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 [5]
Roman (Early Middle Ages;
Mediterranean)
5 [5]
Sources: Beller & Bender (2008), Frank et al. (2008), Pica et al. (2004), and Turner (1951).
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fundamentally different ways (for some concrete ex-
amples, see Table 12.2): vaguely as “many”, by an
elementary word like “five”, by a compound trans-
lating into “2 + 2 + 1”, by five distinct notches on
a stick (or four upright notches crossed by a trans-
verse notch), or by presenting a hand with all fingers
extended (or closed).
The most obvious property in which counting se-
quences can differ is the modality in which they are
implemented: through objects such as tally sticks
or knotted strings (in the case of material systems);
through fingers and body parts more generally (in
the case of body-based systems); through number
words (in the case of verbal systems); and through
written notation such as the Hindu-Arabic digits or
the Roman numerals (in the case of notational sys-
tems). Other properties (illustrated below) involve
the presence or absence of a base and perhaps a
sub-base, the size of such bases, or the regularity
and transparency of how larger number words are
composed.
Crucially, these properties have cognitive impli-
cations, that is, they affect how numbers are rep-
resented and processed (Bender & Beller, 2017;
Bender et al., 2015; Schlimm & Neth, 2008). The
Hindu-Arabic digits, for instance, constitute a deci-
mal system; digits from 1 through 9 are represented
by distinct symbols, the base 10 and the powers to
which it is raised (e.g., 100, 1000, etc.) are repre-
sented by position (this is why the principle is often
called “place-value”: the value of a number is co-
determined by its place). The Roman numerals, by
contrast, constitute a system that uses sub-base 5 in
addition to base 10; basic numbers are largely repre-
sented in a cumulative manner (as I, II, III), whereas
sub-base, base, and their powers are represented by
distinct symbols (V, X, L, C, D, and M). Due to this
cumulative representation of basic numbers instead
of a place-value principle, it is actually easier to ex-
ecute basic arithmetic operations such as addition or
multiplication with the (original) Roman numerals
than with Hindu-Arabic digits (Schlimm & Neth,
2008).
Let us illustrate this for the addition of 16 and 27.
All additions require both declarative and procedural
knowledge. Declarative knowledge in the Hindu-
Arabic system includes the numerical value to which
a symbol refers as well as the sums of all relevant
100 single-digit addition facts. In other words: One
need to know beforehand that the sum of 6 and 7 is
13, and that adding 1, 1, and 2 yields 4. Procedural
knowledge includes, minimally, that numbers need
to be written so that the smallest values (the most
rightward number in each number representation)
are aligned, that numbers need to be added by po-
sition, starting from the right, and what to do with
carries:
Adding the very same numbers with Roman nu-
merals (XXVI and XVII) also requires declarative
and procedural knowledge. Here, however, the
declarative knowledge only needs to include the
order of the basic symbols (according to their value)
and the simplification rules inherent in the counting
sequence, such as IIIII → V and VV → X. Procedu-
ral knowledge gets by with a few very simple tricks:
start by joining the symbols of the addends
X X V I X V I I
order them according to their values
X X X V V I I I
and then simplify, with V V → X:
X X X X I I I
As this example illustrates, the manner in which
numbers are represented in each of the two sys-
tems has an impact on how numerical information is
processed—some operations are just more straight-
forward with one type of representation than with an-
other. This phenomenon is called representational
effect (Zhang & Norman, 1995), and it emerges not
only for notational systems but for number systems
in general (Bender & Beller, 2012, 2018).
Another instance of this effect is that a system will
be understood, learned, and mastered more easily if
it is regularly structured and transparent. Compared
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to number systems in East-Asian and Polynesian
languages (Bender et al., 2015; Miura, 1987), the
systems in many Indo-European languages includ-
ing English are pretty irregular. The number words
from 1 through 10 are distinct and arbitrary, as in all
decimal verbal systems. Once base 10 is reached,
starting a new counting cycle with regularly com-
posed number words such as “ten-and-one”, “ten-
and-two”, etc. would reveal the base 10 structure.
English, however, blurs this structure with its spe-
cific number words “eleven” and “twelve”. Not
even “thirteen” is recognizable as “ten-and-three”,
which is why only at “fourteen” may a novice begin
to sense a recurrent pattern in the suffixed “-teen”
(Bender & Beller, 2018). Moreover, the difference
between numerals like “thirteen” and “thirty” hinges
on a crucial distinction between -teen and -ty, both
of which refer to the same number (10) though and
should therefore actually be identical. As a con-
sequence of these irregularities, English-speaking
children take more time than Chinese-speaking chil-
dren to learn their system and require more effort
for grasping its decimal structure and the algorithms
based on it (Fuson & Kwon, 1991; Miller et al.,
1995).
12.4 Language as Tool for Thought
As should have become clear by now, language is an
important tool for thought, aiding the coding, cate-
gorization, and storing of information as well as pro-
cesses of reasoning, decision making, and problem
solving. As we know from classic experiments in
psychology (see Chapter 9, “Problem Solving”), the
properties of a tool and the habits acquired during its
usage tend to affect how the tool is applied. One in-
stance illustrating this influence is the phenomenon
of functional fixedness: the tendency to use a tool in
conventional ways even if a new problem requires
a novel application (Duncker, 1935; Glucksberg &
Danks, 1968). A second instance is the so-called set
effect (or Einstellung effect): the tendency to stick
to a procedure that has worked before even if the
new problem requires a novel approach (Luchins &
Luchins, 1959). Applied to the case of language, we
distinguish in this last section two states of familiar-
ity: the standard state of a familiar language serving
as a well-known tool (sections 12.4.1), and the im-
plications that arise from using a foreign language
as an unfamiliar tool (sections 12.4.2). In contrast
to the familiar tool, which reinforces our cognitive
habits, the unfamiliar tool seems to reset these habits
to some extent.
12.4.1 Familiar Tool: Thinking by
Language
The first language we acquire is our native language
or mother tongue, and this language is with us dur-
ing major parts of cognitive development, while we
learn to categorize the things we perceive, discover
the world of numbers, or try to figure out solutions
for reasoning tasks and decision problems. As noted
by developmental psychologists in the tradition of
Vygotsky and Piaget, language and thought become
entangled in a complex relationship during this pro-
cess. In other words: language itself is like a glue
that keeps our non-domain-specific, cross-modular,
propositional thoughts together, “not just in the
sense that language is a necessary condition for us to
entertain such thoughts but in the stronger sense that
natural language representations are the bearers of
those propositional thought-contents” (Carruthers,
2002).
An example of the crucial role of language is the
emergence and development of a “theory of mind”
in children, which seems to benefit greatly from
linguistic support (Pyers & Senghas, 2009; de Vil-
liers, 2007). Theory-of-mind abilities emerge in all
normally developing human children; their onset,
however, depends on the amount of mental-state talk
in parent-child interactions. For instance, whereas
in the Western world, reflections on others’ mental
states are a topic of widespread interest and conver-
sation, numerous societies across the world appear
to adopt a perspective according to which mental
states are private and opaque (Luhrmann 2011). This
reluctance to openly speculate about the feelings, in-
tentions, or thoughts of others affects the ease with
which children acquire an understanding of such
notions (Vinden 1996; Wassmann et al. 2013).
A second example for illustrating the role of lan-
guage for cognition in a more general sense is nu-
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merical cognition, for here the invention of number
words was indispensable for processes of counting
and calculating (see section 12.3.2). In this case, spe-
cific linguistic representations are so essential for
cognitive processing that they are considered a com-
ponent of cognition itself. Such instances constitute
cases of extended cognition, in which information is
distributed to both mental and non-mental states and
in which cognitive processing involves both types
of information (Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Hutchins,
1995; Norman, 1993). For instance, the computation
of 26 and 17 described earlier requires information
on what each numerical symbol means or how to ex-
ecute a column addition (stored mentally), but also
relies on the presence of the numerals (stored on a
piece of paper).
Explanations of why using language as a tool
would affect thought follow a slightly different track,
where perception and categorization are concerned.
Explanations in this domain are based on the well-
known fact that information processing unfolds as
an interplay between bottom-up processing of sen-
sory signals and top-down predictions about what
these signals might be. In this interplay, language
plays a key role in that it serves as a main source for
generating predictions. If these predictions happen
to match the stimulus perceived, they help to dis-
cover things that would have otherwise been missed
(Lupyan & Clark, 2015; Lupyan & Ward, 2013).
This approach is refined by Cibelli and colleagues
(2016) for the controversial case of color perception.
It takes its point of departure in the category ad-
justment model proposed by Huttenlocher and col-
leagues (1991), according to which we tend to use in-
formation from two different sources when we have
to draw inferences under uncertainty. One source is
a fine-grained representation of the perceived stim-
ulus itself, the other source is a categorical system
devoted to the organization of perceptions and mem-
ories. If, for instance, we try to recall the exact color
of a stimulus, the two sources would be the color
seen and the linguistic color category in which it
falls. An influence of language on memory would
here be diagnosed when the recalled color shade
shifts in the direction of the prototypical shade of
the respective color category. This should be the
stronger, the less certain we are with regard to our
sensory impression, for instance because the stimu-
lus perception itself was imprecise or because our
memory of it is fading away.
It is exactly this correlation that Cibelli and col-
leagues (2016) observed, both in empirical studies
in which they manipulated the time span between
the presentation of the stimulus and the recall of the
memory, and in computer simulations of data from
cross-linguistic studies. Their account also provides
an elegant explanation of why effects of linguistic
relativity are not always reliably replicated—namely,
when experimental designs enable relatively high
degrees of certainty in participants’ perception or
memory. Finally, this model also allows account-
ing for influences of language on cognition while at
the same time supposing a universal foundation for
cognition.
In the two instances described in sections 12.3.1
and 12.3.2, language is actively used as an aid to cod-
ing, storing, and reasoning: the color terms provided
by language as a tool for identifying and memorizing
color, and number words as a tool for counting and
calculating. In these cases, language directly affects
cognitive processes, either because the linguistic rep-
resentations enter into conflict with non-linguistic
representations (language as meddler) or because
the linguistic representations support, augment, or
even make possible the non-linguistic representa-
tions (language as augmenter). Typically, this kind
of online influence diminishes when participants are
prevented from making use of language, for instance,
by way of a verbal interference task (e.g., Frank et
al., 2012; Roberson & Davidoff, 2000). The same
holds, of course, for instances of thinking for speak-
ing, as in the absence of a need for speaking the
effect will not arise. Instances of thinking after lan-
guage are different. Here, the language-inherent
need to pay attention to some information more than
other information has led to a form of habituation
that renders grammatically relevant aspects salient
(spotlight effect) even without immediate involve-
ment of language. An indirect or offline influence of
language like this is less likely suppressed by verbal
interference.
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Table 12.3: Framing variants of the Asian Disease task.
Alternative A (certain) Alternative B (uncertain)
positive framing 200 people will be saved. 1/3 probability that all 600 will be saved,
2/3 probability that none will be saved.
negative framing 400 people will die. 1/3 probability that nobody will die,
2/3 probability that all 600 will die.
12.4.2 Unfamiliar Tool: Thinking in a
Foreign Language
Speaking a second language has implications for
how one thinks. While habituated patterns of
thought typically develop in line with the dominant
language, bilinguals seem to switch between pat-
terns of thought, rather than transferring the pattern
from their dominant to the non-dominant language
(Kousta et al., 2008). In fact, learning a new lan-
guage with novel grammatical categories appears
to entail a cognitive restructuring in the bilingual
mind (Athanasopoulos, 2007). But using a sec-
ond language while thinking may also have more
general effects on the outcome of the thinking pro-
cess.
Keysar and colleagues (2012) first described what
has since been called the foreign language effect:
When their participants worked on a set of classic
decision tasks in a foreign language, their decisions
differed significantly from those observed with the
same type of problems in their native language. A ro-
bust finding in this research field is, for instance, that
the decisions we make depend upon framing (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1981): We avoid risks if the task
is framed positively (as something we can gain), but
are risk-seeking if the—actually identical—result is
framed negatively (as a loss), as in the case of the
“Asian disease” task (Table 12.3).
The participants in the study by Keysar and col-
leagues (2012) exhibited the well-known pattern
when working on the task in their native language.
When working on it in a foreign language, however,
the extent to which they opted for the safe versus
risky option was independent of the framing.
A series of studies has now documented such a
foreign language effect for various tasks and con-
texts, including gambling, mental book-keeping,
risk awareness, or moral judgments (overview in
Hayakawa et al., 2016). In moral dilemmas, for in-
stance, people using a foreign language are more
inclined to make utilitarian decisions by weighing
the result more strongly than the means or inten-
tions that lead to it (Geipel et al., 2016). When
confronted with the (hypothetical) dilemma of sac-
rificing one human life to save five others, par-
ticipants find it more acceptable to do so if they
only have to hit a switch (thereby diverting a trol-
ley so that it runs over a single person instead of
five people) than if they were to actively push the
single person from a bridge (thereby bringing the
trolley to a halt and preventing it from running
over the five people). The outcome is the same
in both cases (five lives saved at the cost of one), but
the reluctance is much greater in the second case—
normally. If, by contrast, the dilemma is presented
in a foreign language, the greater good outweighs
the moral rule of not inflicting damage on another
person, and pushing the single person appears much
more acceptable (Costa et al., 2014; Geipel et al.,
2015).
The exact mechanism underlying such effects of
foreign language usage is not yet clear. Keysar and
colleagues (2012) interpret their findings as evidence
for the assumption that the cognitive processing in
the foreign language is accompanied by a greater
psychological distance and is not anchored emotion-
ally to the same extent as is the case for processing
in the native language (see also Hayakawa et al.,
2016; Pavlenko, 2012). This would also explain
why swearwords appear less insulting, declarations
of love less romantic, and books less exciting in a
foreign language (Caldwell-Harris, 2015).
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12.4.3 Conclusion
For several decades, the principle of linguistic rel-
ativity was disregarded as a topic of interest in the
cognitive sciences, largely due to Chomsky’s influ-
ence. Reintroduced as a topic worthy of scientific
investigation in the 1990ies (Gumperz & Levinson,
1996; Lee, 1996; Lucy, 1992a, 1992b, 1997), it is
today one of the most thriving and thrilling fields in
cognitive science (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001; Dolscheid
et al., 2013; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Haun
et al., 2011). As mentioned in the introduction, the
discussion is still controversial, but evidence in sup-
port of at least some versions of linguistic relativity
is accumulating. The same is true for theoretical
attempts to reconcile the idea that cognition may
be susceptible to influences of language on the one
hand with one of the key assumptions of cognitive
science, the universality of cognitive processes, on
the other (e.g., Cibelli et al., 2016; Lupyan & Clark,
2015).
Language provides structure that leads us to pay
more attention to some information than to other
information; it provides categorical systems that are
used to adjust uncertain assessments, and it provides
conceptual bricks that help scaffold cognitive skills.
Still, we are not at the mercy of these tools—if they
cease to serve their purpose or to achieve their goal,
we are able and apt to adjust them, for instance by
simply inventing new color terms or increasing the
range of number words needed for counting (Beller
& Bender, 2008). It is exactly for this reason that
humans in the history of their species were able to at-
tain ever greater goals with increasingly well suited
tools (Miller & Paredes, 1996). This also holds for
language as our most important tool for thought.
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Summary
According to the principle of linguistic relativity, most prominently proposed by Whorf, the language
we speak affects the way we think. Three theses are central to this account: that languages differ
in how they describe the world; that the way in which a language describes the world affects the
experiences had by its speakers; and that speakers of different languages therefore have different
experiences. The underlying idea is still controversial in parts of cognitive science, but evidence
is accumulating in support of its three most plausible readings, namely that language may affect
thought in terms of thinking before language (as thinking for speaking), with language (as meddler
or as augmenter), and after language (as spotlight). In this chapter, we summarize research on
four domains, to illustrate arguments and approaches in the field. In order to raise awareness for
critical issues, we begin with grammatical gender, originally claimed as an instance of the spotlight
effect, but used here as a counter-example. More convincing instances are spatial references (for the
spotlight effect), the influence of the color lexicon on color categorization (language as meddler),
and the role of number words for numerical cognition (language as augmenter). In conclusion, we
elaborate on the role of language as a tool for thought, including the differences that occur when
using a foreign language while thinking.
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Review Questions
1. In section 12.1.3 we briefly present several accounts of the relation between language and
thought. Which of these qualify as versions of linguistic relativity?
2. Why is grammatical gender a tempting candidate for investigations of linguistic relativity, and
why is it still not the most suitable candidate?
3. How are thinking for speaking and the spotlight effect related?
4. In section 12.3.2, we claimed that a conventionalized sequence of number representations is a
crucial tool for counting and calculation. How important is it that this sequence consists of
number words rather than, say, notches on a stick?
5. How does the foreign language effect speak to the claim that language affects thought?
Hot Topic: Is Grammatical Gender an Instance of Linguistic Relativity?
Andrea Bender
The relationship between culture, language, and cognition, as well as their
(co-)evolution, has fascinated me since the beginning of my academic career
when I was working as a cultural anthropologist, and it constitutes the main
area of my research in cognitive science and psychology today. My interests
include number representations and their cognitive implications, spatial and
temporal references, the evolution and cultural constitution of causal cogni-
tion, and the possible influence of linguistic categories on thought (known as
linguistic relativity).
A topic that has been controversially debated for decades is whether gram-
matical gender qualifies as an instance of linguistic relativity. In languages
with a formal gender system, all nouns are assigned to one of several classes that determine the
declension of associated words. For instance, the moon has masculine gender in German (der Mond),
whereas the sun has feminine gender (die Sonne). Is, therefore, the sun conceived as more feminine
than the moon by German speakers? One indicator for such an influence is the “gender congruency
effect”. It emerges if the grammatical gender of a noun (masculine for Mond) is congruent with the
association of its referent with a specific sex (here: as male).
In previous research, participants were often directly asked for such associations. A major issue
with explicit measures like this is that information on grammatical gender can be actively used
to aid the decision. In our own work with speakers of German, we therefore used an implicit
measure. Participants were asked to categorize nouns according to criteria not obviously related to
gender associations. Critically, the stimuli themselves constituted either congruent or incongruent
cases; faster and/or more accurate responses in the congruent than the incongruent cases would
then attest to a gender congruency effect. We examined nouns for which grammatical gender
and biological sex were congruent or incongruent (Bender, Beller, & Klauer, 2016a), for which
grammatical gender and allegorical association were congruent or incongruent (Bender, Beller, &
Klauer, 2016b), or for which grammatical gender was related to sex (masculine/feminine) or not
related to sex (neuter) (Bender, Beller, & Klauer, 2018). Across these studies, a gender congruency
effect emerged for all those nouns that had strong male or female connotations, almost regardless of
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their gender, suggesting that the semantic association of the nouns has a much stronger effect than
their grammatical gender.
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Glossary
foreign language effect Processing information
in a foreign language affects decision mak-
ing under uncertainty, moral judgments, and
emotional responses. 225
linguistic determinism Strongest version of lin-
guistic relativity, according to which peo-
ple would be able to engage only in those
thoughts that their language permits; is of lit-
tle intuitive plausibility and largely refuted by
empirical research. 216
principle of linguistic relativity Proposed by
Whorf and others, stating that humans cannot
objectively describe the world because they
are influenced in their perceptions and catego-
rizations by the linguistic structures implicit
in their mother tongue. 214
representational effect Information is processed
differently depending on how it is represented.
222
thinking for speaking Coined by Dan Slobin for
the fact that, in order to put our thoughts into
words, we need to organize our thoughts in
such a way that they specify all those aspects
that are required by the grammatical structure
of the respective language. 217
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